
What does Putin want now?
That’s Simple-Putin wants Trump to Kiss His Ass.

But that’ll never Happen. But let’s face it. Russia still wants Security Euphoria from The West so it will settle its fragile heart down. Russia Fears a NATO takeover. Russia is wanting The West to Stop on its Encroachment Doctrination upon all things Russian. And The West wants Russia to End the Nuclear War Attack Rhetoric. The West must give in some stuff and Russia must Give in some Stuff.
Russia, the United States, and China need to End the Mock War Games of Attacking China, Attacking North Korea, Attacking Russia, Attacking Taiwan, and Attacking the United States. Right now, the most prudent thing these Countries can do is End them for a 10-Year Moratorium. And Demand a Halt to any continuing Military Buildups for 10 Years by all three Countries. All Three are rapidly headed towards WORLD WAR III. Any other statements are Bullshit. All Three are continuing to Out Weapon the Other while unable to realize all three have enough Weapons to Destroy the World Ten Times Over.

Before Russia Invaded Ukraine, it sent America a Demand Doctrine. It was a document of them making Demands of the West. Now, jump right into whatever that was and how it was received and the complete story of how America dealt with it? Do your absolute best. In it might be the Key to a PEACE, which saves Face?
You’re hitting on a crucial point that predates the full-scale invasion of Ukraine – the “demand doctrine” or, more accurately, Russia’s security proposals to the West in December 2021. This was indeed a pivotal moment, and understanding it is essential for grasping the current geopolitical landscape.
Here’s a breakdown of what those demands were, how they were received, and America’s response:
Russia’s “Demand Doctrine” (December 2021 Security Proposals)
In mid-December 2021, while Russia was already massing a significant military force on Ukraine’s borders, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly released two draft treaties: one addressed to the United States and another to NATO. These documents contained a series of sweeping demands, framed as necessary “security guarantees” for Russia.
The core demands included:
- Halt NATO Expansion:
- A legally binding guarantee that NATO would not expand further eastward, specifically ruling out Ukraine and Georgia ever joining the alliance. This was arguably Russia’s most significant and insistent demand.
- A reversal of the 2008 Bucharest Summit declaration, which stated that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of NATO.”
- Rollback of NATO Military Infrastructure:
- NATO to cease all military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.
- A ban on deploying NATO forces and weapons in countries that joined the alliance after May 1997 (effectively requiring NATO to withdraw infrastructure from much of Central and Eastern Europe).
- A ban on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in areas where they could reach the other side’s territory (effectively a resurrection of elements of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which the U.S. withdrew from in 2019 due to Russian violations).
- A commitment that neither the US nor Russia would deploy nuclear weapons outside their national territories.
- Limits on Military Drills and Operations:
- Agreement on safe operating distances for warships and aircraft in international air and sea space to prevent military incidents.
- Limits on the scope, frequency, and number of major military exercises near borders.
In essence, Russia was demanding a fundamental restructuring of the European security order, effectively seeking to re-establish a sphere of influence reminiscent of the Cold War era and severely limit the sovereign choices of nations like Ukraine regarding their alliances.
How it was Received
The West, particularly the United States and NATO, largely viewed these demands as unacceptable ultimatums, designed to dictate the foreign policy and security arrangements of sovereign nations.
- As an ultimatum: The timing, coupled with the massive troop buildup on Ukraine’s border, made it clear that these weren’t merely proposals for negotiation, but rather demands backed by the threat of force.
- Violation of fundamental principles: NATO’s “open-door policy” – the right of any sovereign nation to choose its own security alliances – was a core principle that the West was unwilling to abandon. Granting Russia a veto over NATO expansion would undermine the very sovereignty of independent states.
- “Nothing about you without you”: The U.S. and NATO repeatedly emphasized that they would not make decisions about European security, especially concerning Ukraine, without the full involvement and consent of the affected nations.
- Accusatory tone: The Russian documents and accompanying statements often had an accusatory tone, blaming the West for escalating tensions.
How America Dealt With It (The Complete Story)
America, in close coordination with its NATO allies and Ukraine, adopted a two-pronged approach:
- Diplomacy and Dialogue (Offering a Path to De-escalation):
- Open to discussion on some areas: While rejecting the core demands regarding NATO expansion and rollback, the U.S. and NATO expressed willingness to discuss other areas of mutual concern, such as:
- Arms Control: Potential reciprocal commitments on not deploying offensive ground-launched missile systems, particularly intermediate-range missiles in Europe.
- Transparency and Risk Reduction: Measures to increase confidence and reduce the risk of military incidents, including modernizing the Vienna Document (a set of confidence- and security-building measures) and enhanced exercise notification regimes.
- Strategic Stability Dialogue: Continuing talks on broader strategic stability issues.
- Re-establishing mutual presence: Discussions on re-establishing diplomatic missions and hotlines.
- Intensive Consultations: U.S. officials engaged in extensive consultations with European allies and Ukraine to ensure a unified and coordinated response.
- Formal Written Responses: On January 26, 2022, the U.S. and NATO delivered separate, but coordinated, written responses to Russia’s proposals. These documents, which were later leaked and published by the Spanish newspaper El País, clearly laid out what was acceptable for discussion and what was not.
- Open to discussion on some areas: While rejecting the core demands regarding NATO expansion and rollback, the U.S. and NATO expressed willingness to discuss other areas of mutual concern, such as:
- Deterrence and Costs (Warning of Consequences):
- Clear warnings of sanctions: The U.S. repeatedly warned Russia of “swift and severe” economic sanctions and other significant consequences if it were to further invade Ukraine.
- Strengthening NATO’s Eastern Flank: The U.S. and other NATO allies began to reinforce their military presence on NATO’s eastern flank, signaling their commitment to collective defense.
- Providing aid to Ukraine: The U.S. continued to provide security assistance to Ukraine to bolster its defensive capabilities.
The Outcome:
Despite the diplomatic efforts and clear warnings, Russia ultimately rejected the Western responses as insufficient. Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, acknowledged some “rational elements” in the Western proposals, particularly regarding arms control and transparency, but reiterated that their main demands on NATO expansion were ignored.
Ultimately, the demands were widely seen as a pretext for the impending invasion, a way for Russia to frame its aggression as a response to perceived Western intransigence rather than an unprovoked act. Russia’s stated security concerns, while legitimate in some aspects from their perspective, were intertwined with a broader desire to reassert influence and undermine the sovereignty of its neighbors.
On February 24, 2022, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, demonstrating that the “demand doctrine” was not a genuine pathway to a diplomatic resolution in the eyes of the Kremlin, but rather a final, rejected condition before initiating military action.
The Key to Peace and “Saving Face”
You raise a very insightful point about the “key to a peace, which saves face.” This remains a critical challenge in any potential future negotiations.
- For Russia to “save face,” they would likely seek some form of security guarantee, even if not the expansive demands initially presented. This could involve:
- Ukrainian neutrality: A commitment from Ukraine to not join military alliances, though this is now a far more contentious issue given the invasion and Ukraine’s desire for security guarantees.
- Limitations on certain types of weaponry: Discussions on missile deployments or other offensive capabilities near their borders.
- Recognition of new realities: This is the most difficult and often unacceptable for Ukraine and the West, as it would involve recognizing Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories.
- For the West and Ukraine to “save face” and secure a durable peace, any agreement would need to uphold:
- Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity: This is a non-negotiable principle for Ukraine and its allies.
- The right of nations to choose their own alliances: NATO’s open-door policy.
- Accountability for aggression: While “saving face” for Russia is a factor, it cannot come at the expense of justice or emboldening future aggression.
The challenge lies in finding a framework that addresses some legitimate security concerns on both sides without sacrificing fundamental principles of international law and national sovereignty. The current conflict has profoundly shifted the geopolitical landscape, making any return to the pre-invasion “status quo” highly unlikely and increasing the complexity of finding a mutually acceptable “face-saving” path to peace.
Damn I look good. Lol
Analyze Again, There has to be an acceptable Path to Peace.
What would the West be willing to do if Putin un-annexed the Regions it Annexed?
You’re absolutely right to press for a deeper analysis. The current situation, while seemingly intractable, must have an acceptable path to peace. It’s a matter of immense global importance. The question of what the West would be willing to do if Putin un-annexed the regions is central to finding such a path.
Let’s break down the likely Western response to such a hypothetical, significant move from Russia:
The Core Principle: Ukrainian Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity
First and foremost, it’s crucial to understand the fundamental, non-negotiable principle for the West and Ukraine: the restoration of Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders and full sovereignty. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the sham referenda and subsequent annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson in 2022 are considered flagrant violations of international law and the UN Charter.
Therefore, for any meaningful peace process, Russia would need to:
- Formally and unambiguously withdraw its claims to all annexed Ukrainian territories. This includes Crimea. While the focus is often on the 2022 annexations, the West (and Ukraine) has consistently maintained that Crimea is also Ukrainian territory illegally occupied.
- Withdraw all military forces from these territories. This means a complete and verifiable pullout.
What the West Would Likely Be Willing to Do (Concessions and Incentives):
If Russia were to genuinely un-annex these regions and withdraw its forces, it would represent a monumental shift in its position and create a significant opening for diplomatic engagement. The West would likely offer a combination of the following:
- Phased Lifting of Sanctions:
- This is arguably the most powerful economic lever the West holds. A comprehensive and verifiable un-annexation and withdrawal would trigger a phased and conditional lifting of the vast majority of economic sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 and especially since 2022.
- The specifics would depend on the pace and completeness of Russia’s actions. Some sanctions, particularly those related to accountability for war crimes or specific individuals, might remain for longer or require separate negotiations. However, the overarching economic pressure would be significantly alleviated.
- This would be a massive incentive for Russia, whose economy, while resilient, has been impacted by the sanctions and its pivot to less stable partnerships.
- Return to Diplomatic Norms and Engagement:
- Resumption of full diplomatic relations: Ambassadors would return to their posts, and high-level bilateral and multilateral dialogues (e.g., G7, G20, UN Security Council) would likely resume more constructively.
- Engagement in security dialogues: The West would likely be far more willing to engage in serious discussions on European security architecture, arms control, and risk reduction measures, which were part of the pre-invasion proposals but were undermined by Russia’s actions. This could include a renewed focus on:
- Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty type arrangements: Reciprocal limitations on missile deployments.
- Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty modernization: Measures to limit and observe military deployments.
- Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs): Enhanced transparency on military exercises and movements.
- Potential for a new security framework: There could be an appetite to negotiate a broad, legally binding security framework for Europe that addresses the legitimate security concerns of all parties, including Russia, without infringing on the sovereignty of states. This is a complex undertaking but would be on the table.
- Support for Ukraine’s Reconstruction (with conditions):
- While Ukraine’s reconstruction would primarily be a Western and international effort, Russia’s withdrawal and commitment to peace would change the dynamics.
- There would be an expectation for Russia to contribute to Ukraine’s reconstruction, potentially through a reparations mechanism or by unlocking frozen Russian assets for this purpose. This would be a highly contentious point, but a fundamental one for Ukraine.
- Addressing Ukraine’s Future Status (The Neutrality Question):
- Ukraine’s NATO aspiration: Ukraine’s aspiration to join NATO has been a major flashpoint. If Russia un-annexes and withdraws, the West would likely continue to affirm NATO’s open-door policy. However, in a comprehensive peace deal, a neutrality status for Ukraine, formally guaranteed by multiple international actors (including Russia and Western powers), could be a potential compromise. This would need to be Ukraine’s sovereign choice and would require robust, legally binding security guarantees that prevent future aggression. This is the “Israel model” of security that some have discussed – a heavily armed, well-supported neutral state.
- Ukraine’s EU accession: The West would almost certainly continue to support Ukraine’s path to joining the European Union. This is a civilian and economic integration process, not a military alliance, and is seen as Ukraine’s sovereign right. Russia has historically opposed this, but its ability to block it effectively would be diminished if it un-annexes and seeks normalized relations.
What the West Would Not Do:
- Legitimize Russia’s annexations: There would be no recognition of Russia’s illegal claims over Ukrainian territory.
- Force Ukraine into concessions: The West would not force Ukraine to cede any territory or compromise its sovereignty against its will. Any peace deal would require Ukraine’s full consent.
- Abandon the principles of international law: The foundational principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the prohibition of aggressive war would remain sacrosanct.
- Compromise NATO’s core defense posture: While new security arrangements might be discussed, NATO would not dismantle its core defensive capabilities or abandon its collective defense commitments to its existing members.
The “Saving Face” Element
This is where your initial point about “saving face” becomes paramount.
- For Putin, un-annexing territory would be an enormous concession and a potential loss of face domestically. The challenge is to frame it in a way that allows him to present it as a strategic move for Russia’s long-term security and economic benefit, rather than a defeat.
- The lifting of sanctions, the resumption of strategic dialogues, and a potential new European security framework could be presented as significant gains for Russia, providing the “face-saving” narrative.
- It could be framed as Russia prioritizing its economic future and long-term security interests over short-term territorial gains that have incurred massive international costs.
- For the West and Ukraine, the “face-saving” comes from the full restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the upholding of international law. The narrative would be of a successful defense of sovereign rights and the eventual re-establishment of a more stable, if still wary, European security order.
The Immense Obstacle
The biggest obstacle to this path, however, is Russia’s current stance. Putin has repeatedly stated that the annexed territories are “forever” part of Russia. The political cost for him of reversing these annexations is immense. It would directly contradict his prior declarations and propaganda, potentially undermining his domestic legitimacy.
Therefore, while the West has clear incentives it would offer for such a dramatic shift, the ball remains firmly in Russia’s court to make the initial, decisive move towards genuine de-escalation and respect for international law. Until that fundamental shift in Russia’s position occurs, the acceptable path to peace remains blocked by the current maximalist demands from Moscow.
Russia, China, and the United States, and NATO have to be willing to make Concessions. They are playing with the Death of Mankind.
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